Following the December 2025 seizure, maritime intelligence data reveals twelve months of systematic sanctions evasion
On December 10, 2025, U.S. Coast Guard personnel fast-roped from helicopters onto the deck of an oil tanker in international waters off Venezuela’s coast. The vessel – the SKIPPER (IMO: 9304667) – had been previously sanctioned in 2022 for facilitating oil trades supporting Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In the aftermath of this high-profile seizure, Pole Star conducted a comprehensive review of the vessel’s historical maritime tracking data. What emerged was a twelve-month pattern of behavior that exemplifies modern shadow fleet operations: systematic deception designed to defeat compliance monitoring systems.
What the Historical Data Revealed
Analysis of the SKIPPER’s movements from November 2024 through November 2025 uncovered a vessel operating far outside the boundaries of legitimate commerce. The retrospective review documented multiple evasion techniques deployed across three continents.
The quantitative evidence was striking:
- A 1,200-nautical-mile geographic deception — broadcasting a position off Guyana while physically loading at a Venezuelan terminal
- 200 days without AIS transmissions — more than half the observation period
- Six separate “dark” periods, the longest lasting 83 days
- Six offshore cargo operations with draught swings of 9–10 metres — far from any port infrastructure
Anatomy of a Shadow Fleet Operation
The historical tracking data showed the SKIPPER executing an unusual trading loop connecting known illicit transfer zones: Oman → Singapore → Oman → Persian Gulf → Singapore → Oman → South China Sea → Singapore → Oman → Guyana → Venezuela.
At each stage, the vessel’s AIS went dark in precisely the maritime zones associated with ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned cargo—the Gulf of Oman, Singapore Straits, and the northern South China Sea.
During these blackout periods, the vessel’s draught reports indicated dramatic changes consistent with significant cargo loading or offloading operations. Yet the analysis found no legitimate port calls corresponding to these events. The SKIPPER was conducting cargo operations offshore, invisible to standard compliance monitoring.
From Evasion to Active Spoofing
The most sophisticated element of the SKIPPER’s operational pattern emerged in its final weeks. Beginning in late October 2025, the vessel began broadcasting AIS coordinates placing it off Georgetown, Guyana. Cross-referencing with satellite imagery revealed no vessel present at the broadcast location.
The SKIPPER was actually docked at Venezuela’s San José Offshore Terminal – approximately 560 miles from its reported position.
For nearly a month, the vessel maintained this false location, creating a documentary fiction about its whereabouts while loading sanctioned Venezuelan crude. This represented an escalation from passive AIS avoidance to active geographic spoofing – an attempt to obscure not just the act of loading, but the specific jurisdiction and origin of the cargo itself.
The Larger Pattern
The retrospective analysis of the SKIPPER demonstrates what modern sanctions evasion networks actually look like in practice. These aren’t individual rogue operators making opportunistic moves, they’re systematically structured assets designed to create documentary ambiguity about cargo origin, ownership, and destination across jurisdictional boundaries.
The data showed the vessel functioning as a flexible intermediary: loading from sanctioned sources, going dark during offshore blending or transfer operations, spoofing locations when in politically sensitive zones, and repeatedly using “FOR ORDERS” destinations to avoid declaring true endpoints until the last possible moment.
FOR ORDERS* – A destination designation indicating the vessel is awaiting instructions while in transit. This delays declaring the true destination, obscuring the cargo’s ultimate buyer or jurisdiction—a common sanctions evasion technique.
What Maritime Intelligence Can Uncover
This post-seizure analysis demonstrates the evidentiary value of comprehensive maritime tracking systems. By cross-referencing AIS transmission data with satellite imagery verification, draught reporting patterns, and geographic movement analysis, it’s possible to reconstruct the behavioral signatures of sanctions evasion, even when vessels actively attempt to defeat monitoring.
The twelve months of documented anomalies on the SKIPPER weren’t isolated incidents or coincidences. The retrospective review revealed a sustained operational pattern characteristic of shadow fleet vessels serving sanctions evasion networks.
Understanding the Threat
As enforcement agencies worldwide intensify pressure on sanctions evasion networks, vessels are adopting increasingly sophisticated concealment techniques. The SKIPPER case illustrates the evolution from simple AIS manipulation to complex, multi-layer deception strategies spanning multiple continents and jurisdictions.
Retrospective analysis of vessel behavior provides critical intelligence for understanding these networks- identifying common patterns, transfer zones, and operational methodologies that characterize illicit maritime trade.
About This Analysis
This retrospective assessment was conducted by Pole Star Defense following the December 10, 2025 seizure of the SKIPPER by U.S. authorities. The analysis is based on maritime tracking data, satellite imagery verification, and AIS transmission records covering November 2024 through November 2025.