By Saleem Khan, CDAO, Pole Star Global, and Arsenio Longo, Founder, HUAX
The Signal in the Data
Vessel activity around the Panama Canal is beginning to show a measurable shift. Panama has not suddenly become a substitute for the Strait of Hormuz, but in a capacity-constrained corridor even modest changes in traffic, anchorage behavior, tanker mobility and slot pricing can reveal how trade adapts when another chokepoint becomes commercially and geopolitically uncertain.
In the first half of fiscal year 2026, from October 2025 to March 2026, the Panama Canal recorded 6,288 transits, an increase of 224 year-on-year. Cargo volumes rose to 254 million PC/UMS tons, around 5% above the previous year’s level. Daily transits moved from an average of 34 in January to 37 in March, with several recent peak days exceeding 40 transits.
Market reporting identified the VLCC Gas Virgo, linked to Wanhua, as the vessel behind one reported $4 million Neopanamax auction payment
Those figures alone do not prove a major rerouting shock. The stronger signal is the combination of higher auction prices, stronger approach-zone activity, more energy-linked tonnage and changing reservation behavior. Together, they point to a corridor beginning to absorb pressure from a wider disruption.
Between October 2025 and February 2026, auction prices for Canal slots remained relatively contained. By March and April, they had moved sharply higher, with average auction prices reported around $385,000 and several individual cases exceeding $1 million. Market reporting identified the VLCC Gas Virgo, linked to Wanhua, as the vessel behind one reported $4 million Neopanamax auction payment. That figure is exceptional, but it is also a useful price signal: it shows how much value operators may place on predictable passage when other routes become more exposed to geopolitical risk.
Gas Virgo’s Route from Beaumont, Texas to Beijing, China via the Panama Canal – Source: Pole Star Global MDA – Voyage Duration: April 8th – May 13th)
The Hormuz Factor
The connection between Hormuz and Panama may seem counterintuitive. The Strait of Hormuz remains the world’s most important energy chokepoint, while the Panama Canal cannot take over its crude oil function at scale. Very Large Crude Carriers, which dominate long-haul Gulf crude movements, are generally too large for the Canal’s Neopanamax locks.
The more relevant mechanism is second-order routing pressure. A Hormuz disruption changes how operators, charterers and cargo owners think about timing, insurance, vessel availability, freight economics and political exposure across a wider set of cargoes.
LPG, LNG, refined products, selected crude flows, containerized goods, vehicle carriers and industrial supply chains can all be affected, even if they do not replicate the Gulf crude trade one-for-one. The Canal is not absorbing the primary crude-flow function of Hormuz. It is absorbing part of the secondary routing shock created by Hormuz.
Beyond the Oil Headline
The clearest example is LPG. Unlike VLCC crude flows, LPG cargoes can more plausibly shift between Middle Eastern and Atlantic-basin supply options when risk around Hormuz increases. LPG, mainly propane and butane, is used in cooking, petrochemicals, industrial heating and Asian supply chains.
When Hormuz becomes less predictable, Atlantic-basin alternatives, including US Gulf Coast supply, become more relevant. For those cargoes, the Panama Canal is one practical route connecting US Gulf exports with Asian demand (as shown with Gas Virgo traveling from Beaumont, Texas to Beijing, China).
The Panama Canal is not replacing Hormuz, but it is becoming one of the places where the secondary effects of the Hormuz crisis are visible
HUAX vessel-level analysis of the Pacific approach zone adds a behavioral layer beneath the public traffic and auction data. In our tanker position data sample, 17.8% of the ships were classified as actively transiting the Panama Canal in January and February. In April and May, that number increased to 44.0%. This means tankers were actively traveling about 2.5 times more often in April and May than in January and February, even though we looked at the same type of ships in the same area and used the same method to label their movement.
This should be read as a directional indicator, not as a direct count of vessels or cargo volume. The more modest point is that tankers are moving through the zone more actively. Combined with higher auction prices and changing approach-zone dynamics, the pattern is consistent with a corridor being used more aggressively under global routing pressure.
AIS declarations are self-reported and operationally noisy, so no single field should be treated as proof of cargo or commercial intent. The stronger signal comes from vessel class, movement state, approach-zone behavior, slot pricing, draft levels and commodity logic.
The Commodity Flow That Cannot Simply Reroute
One commodity category complicates the rerouting story: fertilizer. A significant share of fertilizer-related trade depends on flows through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, especially nitrogen and phosphate products bound for agricultural markets in Asia, Africa and other import-dependent regions. But fertilizer does not reroute through Panama as visibly as LPG or selected energy-linked cargoes. Distances, vessel types, production locations and terminal alignments often make rerouting difficult or uneconomic.
Not every disruption appears immediately as congestion, higher auction prices or anchorage pressure. Some effects become visible later, in planting decisions, crop yields, food prices and import bills. The Hormuz crisis should therefore not be treated only as an oil story. It is also an agricultural-input story.
The Panama data captures part of the rerouting pressure. Fertilizer points to the other side of the disruption: effects that may appear later, and in less direct ways.
Gulf/Hormuz Fertilizer Carriers –> delays/loitering/reroutes –> import availability –> input prices –> yields –> retail CPI impact
Reading the Timeline
Pole Star Global’s Meridia vessel activity data points to a modest increase in Panama Canal zone activity after the Hormuz disruption intensified. It should not be overstated, but when paired with auction pressure, commodity logic and HUAX vessel-behavior analysis, it becomes more meaningful.
The approach-zone behavior is also worth watching. If more vessels are staging, anchoring, moving through or repositioning around the Canal entrances, the signal is not just about monthly transit totals. It is about how operators are adjusting around a corridor that may carry more pressure when other routes become less predictable.
Crisis routing rarely follows normal economics. It often produces movements that look expensive, indirect or commercially unusual compared with ordinary market conditions. Operators accept those costs when the alternative is uncertainty around a major conflict zone.
Pole Star Global and HUAX View
The Panama Canal signal is best understood as a real-time indicator of global trade stress. Disruption at one major chokepoint is producing measurable pressure in another, very different, capacity-constrained corridor.
Maritime trade is resilient, but its flexibility depends on chokepoints that have physical, commercial and political limits. When a geopolitical shock meets those limits, cargo may be delayed, rerouted, repriced or reduced depending on vessel class, cargo type, insurance exposure and available infrastructure.
Pole Star Global’s Meridia data and HUAX vessel-behavior analysis point to the same broad conclusion: the Panama Canal is not replacing Hormuz, but it is becoming one of the places where the secondary effects of the Hormuz crisis are visible.
The key question is not simply whether a chokepoint remains open, but whether the wider maritime system can still move cargo predictably when one of its main routes becomes politically and commercially unstable.
Data sources: Pole Star Global Meridia, Panama Canal Authority, HUAX, market and public reporting.